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How did highly indebted  poor  countries  become highly indebted?
Reviewing two decades  of debt relief
William Easterly
World Bank'
Views  expressed here are not necessarily those of the World Bank or its member  governments. I am
grateful  to Craig Burnside,  David Dollar,  Bernhard Gunter,  Mary  Hallward-Draiemeier,  Aart Kraay,
Robert Powell, Sergio Schmukler,  and Axel Van  Trotsenburg  for helpful comments,  to seminar
participants  at the IMF Institute  and the World  Bank for their comments,  to Punam Chuhan  for
providing  access to debt service  projections used in the calculation  of the present value of debt series,
and to Shelley  Fu and Hairong  Yu for processing  the debt service  data.2
The highly indebted  poor country  of Haiti is not growing.  The ratio of foreign  debt
service  to exports has reached  40 percent, well above  the 20-25  percent thought  to be
"sustainable." 2 The debt was accumulated  not to finance  productive  investments,  but to finance
the government's  patronage employment  and large military  and police  forces. Corruption  has
been endemic,  so there is the suspicion  that some of the proceeds  of foreign  loans found their way
into the pockets  of the rulers. This is a description  of Haiti's experience  in the '90s.  However,  the
'90s to which  these facts refer are not the 1990s, but the 1890s. 3
The problem  of highly indebted  countries is not a new one. From the two Greek  city-
states who defaulted  on loans from the Delos Temple  in the fourth century BC to Mexico's
default  on its first foreign  loan after independence  in 1827  to Haiti's 1997  ratio of debt to exports
of 484 percent, debt servicing  difficulties  have  been a feature of the world  economy  throughout
history. 4
But the problems  of the highly indebted  poor countries  are very much in the news today
(in the recent hit movie  Notting  Hill, Hugh Grant even  mentions  "cancellation  of Third World
debt" to woo Julia Roberts). Many governments  and non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs)
call for a write-off of all debt of poor countries  on the occasion  of the turning  of the rnillenium
(Jubilee  2000). Support for Jubilee  2000 has been expressed  by such diverse  figures  as Bono  from
the rock group U2, the Pope, Jeffrey  Sachs, and the Dalai Lama. 5
The World Bank and IMF already have a program called the HIPC (Highly  Indebted  Poor
Countries) Initiative  to provide  debt writedowns  - including  for the first tirne,  writedowns  of IMF
2 World  Bank  1998,  p. 56
Dupuy  1989,  p. 116,  Lundahl  p. 39,  41,  244
4Dommen  1989,  Winkler  1933,  p. 22 and  Wynne  1951,  p. 5-7
5On  September  23, 1999,  a delegation  including  U2  's Bono,  pop  entertainment  figures  Quincy  Jones  and
Bob  Geldof,  and  Jeffrey  Sachs  met  with  Pope  John  Paul  II on Third  World  debt  relief.  For more  on  Jubilee
2000,  see  the web  sites  wwwj2000usa.org  and  wwwjubilee2000uk.org.3
and World Bank claims  in present  value terms -- for poor countries  with good policies.  The G-7
Summit  in Cologne  in June 1999 agreed on an expansion  of this program, speeding  up the
process of receiving  relief and increasing  the amount  of debt relief provided for each count:y. The
proposed expansion  would increase  the total cost - in net present value terms -- of the HIP('
Initiative from US$12.5 billion  to US$27  billion. 6 (The World Bank defines  41 countries as
highly indebted  poor countries  -HIPCs. The HIPC problem  has an Africa slant, as 33 of the 41
HIPCs are in Africa; 4 are in Latin America.)  Jeffrey  Sachs suggests  that that the World Bank,
IMF, commercial  banks and rich country  govermments  could absorb a write-off  of the $106
billion the pooresi-  countries currently  owe to them. 7
I. Introduction
Although  there were intimations  as long ago as 1967 that "debt-service  payments  have
risen to the point at which a number of countries  face critical situations",  the current wave cf debt
relief for poor countries  really got underway  in 1979.s  The 1979 World  Debt Tables of the World
Bank noted "lagging  debt payment" on official  loans to poor countries,  although  "debt or debt
service forgiveness  has eased the problems for some."  The 1977-79  UNCTAD  meetings  led to
official creditors  writing off S6  billion in debt to 45 poor countries.  The measures  by official
creditors  included  "the elimination  of interest payments,  the rescheduling  of debt service,  lo::a]
cost assistance, untied  compensatory  aid, and new grants to reimburse  old debts." 9
The 1981  Africa report by the World Bank (usually known as the Berg Report)  note  l that
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan,  Zaire, and Zambia (all of which would  become  HIPCs) had al ea  dy
experienced  "severe  debt-servicing  difficulties"  in the 1970s and "are likely  to continue  to d:  so
6 International  Herald Tribune,  p. 1, June  14, 1999;  Financial Times  June  21, 1999  p. 3; see also  the World
Bank  web  site  on the HIPC  Initiative  www.worldbank.orglhipc.
International  Herald  Tribune,  p. 6, June  12, 1999.  See  also  Center  for  International  Development  199S.
8 The quote is from IJNCTAD  1967 p. 3
9 World  Bank,  1979,  pp. 7-8,  UNCTAD  1983  p. 34
in the 1980s."  The Berg Report hinted  of debt relief,  namely "longer-term  solutions  for debt
crises should  be sought" and "the present practice  of {  donors  } separating  aid and debt decisions
may be counterproductive."  '0
The 1984  World Bank Africa report was more forthright:  "where monitorable  programs
exist, multiyear  debt relief and longer grace  periods should be part of the package of financial
support to the program.""  The wording  got even  stronger in the World Bank's 1986  Africa
report: low income  Africa's fnancing needs will "have to be filled  by additional  bilateral aid and
debt relief."'' 2 The Bank's 1991 Africa report continued  escalating  the rhetoric: "Africa cannot
escape its present economic  crisis without  reducing  its debt burden sizably."' 3
Meanwhile,  the June 1987 G-7 sunmit in Venice  called for interest rate relief on debt of
low-income  countries. The World Bank noted "the past year has brought increasing  recognition
of the urgency of the debt problems  of the low-income  countries of Sub-Saharan Africa..""4  One
year later, the June 1988  G-7 summit  in Toronto agreed  on a menu of options, including  partial
forgiveness,  longer maturities,  and lower interest rates (these  became  known  as the "Toronto
terms".)' 5 Meanwhile,  in order to help African  countries service  their official  debt, the World
Bank in December 1987 initiated  a Special Program  of Assistance  (SPA) to low-income  Africa.
The IMF complemented  the SPA with the Enhanced  Structural Adjustment  Facility  (ESAF). Both
programs  sought to provide  "substantially  increased,  quick-disbursing,  highly concessional
10World  Bank,  1981,  p. 129
1 World  Bank,  1984,  p. 46
12 World  Bank  1986,  p.41
13 WorldBank 1991a,  p. 176
14 World  Bank,  1988a,  p. xix. The  general  literature  started  noticing  low-income  African  debt  at about  the
same  time. See  Lancaster  and  Williamson  1986,  Mistry  1988,  Greene  1989,  Parfitt  and  Riley  1989,
Humphreys  and  Underwood  1989,  Husain  and  Underwood  1991,  and  Nafziger  1993.  For  more  recent
compilations  of analysis,  see  Iqbal  and  Kanbur  1997  and  Brooks  et al. 1998.
15 World  Bank,  1988b,  p. xxxviii.5
assistance  to adjusting  countries."' 6 The 1990  Houston G-7 summit considered  "more
concessional  reschledulings  for the poorest debtor countries."  The UJK  and the Netherlands
proposed "  Trinidad  terms" that would increase  the grant element  of debt reduction  to 67 per  went,
from 20 percent under the " Toronto terms."'7 The 1991 London G-7 summit agreed "on the need
for additional  debt relief measures.  ..going  well beyond  the relief already granted  under Tor  :n:o
terms.", 18 Through  November 1993,  the Paris Club (the club of official lenders)  applied Enhmnced
Toronto Terms that were even  more concessional.' 9 In December 1994,  the Paris Club announced
"Naples Terms"  under which eligible  countries  would receive  yet additional  debt relief. 20
Then, in September  1996,  the IMF and World Bank announced  the HIPC (Highly
Indebted  Poor Countries) Debt Initiative,  which  was to allow the poor countries to "exit, once and
for all, from the rescheduling  process" and to resume "normal  relations with the international
financial  community,  characterized  by spontaneous  financial  flows and the full honoring of
commitments."  The multilateral  lenders  for the first time  would "take action to reduce the burden
of their claims on a given country,"  albeit conditional  on good policies in the recipient  countries.
The Paris Club at the same  time agreed to go beyond  Naples Terms and provide  an 80 percenat
debt reduction  in net present value terms. 21 By September  1999,  debt relief packages had beecn
agreed for 7 poor countries,  totaling  more than $3.4 billion in debt relief in net present value
terms. 22 Then, as we saw above, there were renewed  calls in 1999  for expansion  of this prog mnl.
16 World  Bank 1989,  p. 31.
17 World  Bank,  1990,  p. 29.
18 World  Banlk,  199  lb, p. 31.
19 World  Bank,  1993,  p. 6.
20  World  Bank,  1994,  p. 42.
21 P. 126,  129  Boote  et al. 1997.
22  P. 76  World  Bank.,  1999  and  the  web  site  www.worldbank.org/hipc.  The  seven  countries  are Bolivii,
Burkina  Faso,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Guyana,  Mali,  Mozambique,  and  Uganda.  According  to the  Bank's  web  E te,
in addition  "Ethiopia,  Guinea-Bissau,  Nicaragua,  Mauritania  and  Tanzania  have  completed  a prelimin  ry
review  and  could  qualify  for  billions  more  in debt  relief."6
Besides explicit debt relief, there also has been an implicit form of debt relief going on
throughout  the period, which  is the substitution  of concessional  debt for non-concessional  debt.
It's remarkable  that the net present  value of future debt service  for HIPCs rose throughout  the
period despite  the large net transfers  of resources  from concessional  lenders like  the International
Development  Association  of the World Bank and the concessional  arms of bilateral and other
multilateral  agencies.
The necessity to provide  continuing  waves of debt relief one after another,  from
UNCTAD  to Venice to Toronto to Houston  to Trinidad  to London  to Naples to HIPC to expanded
HIPC, all the while substituting  concessional  for non-concessional  debt, may suggest something
is wrong  with the implementation  of debt relief. There  is the paradox that a large group of
countries came to be defined  as highly indebted  at the end of two  decades of debt relief and
increased  concessional  financing.
This paper reviews  possible  explanations.  The revealed  preference  of debtors for high
debt may simply  lead to new borrowing  to replace  old cancelled  debts. Even if borrowing is
constrained,  poor countries that have a high discount  rate against the future may run down
country  assets. This is the external adjustment  equivalent  to the fiscal adjustment  "illusion"
discussed  by Easterly (1999).
The granting  of progressively  more  favorable  terms for debt relief may also have
perverse incentive  effects, as countries  borrow in anticipation  of debt forgiveness  and delay
policy  reforms waiting for the best deal. Burnside  and Dollar 1997  and World Bank 1998 suggest
that aid does not raise growth  in countries  with  poor economic  policies. The World Bank's latest
Africa report (World Bank 1  994b) suggested  that many African countries  failed to depart from
poor economic  policies during  the process of receiving  adjustment  loans from the World Bank
and International  Monetary  Fund.7
Since pri vate lending  withdraws  because  of the poor creditworthiness  of HIPCs, the
process of debt relief has also led to a substitution of official  lending  for private lending  and
foreign  direct investment,  which raises the concern  that official  lending  may have not followved
the same standards of creditworthiness  as private  lending.,  There has been a redistribution  cf roles
even among official  lenders,  with some agencies  making  net transfers (debt flows net of interest)
to HIPCs and others receiving  net transfers from HIPCs.
In this paper, I first present a very simple  intertemporal  model  of national wealth and the
current account to evaluate  debt relief. The intertemporal  approach  to the current  account is
standard in modern  macroeconomics  (e.g. Obstfeld  and Rogoff 1996). I then examine the
empirical  experience  with debt relief.
II. A theoretical  model of debt  relief
I hypothesize  that a country  that has gotten  an "excessive"  external debt is one with a
high discount  rate against the future (perhaps  because of a profligate  government  and/or because
of political instability  or interest group polarization)  and/or a low intertemporal  elasticity  of
substitution  (ITES). 23 After receiving  debt relief, the high-discount-rate,  low ITES country  viould
like to accumulate  the same  amount of external debt again. There will be an amount of new
borrowing  corresponding  to the amount  of debt  relief, until the old ratio of net worth to GDP is
restored. Alternatively,  debt relief conditionality  could try to control new borrowing  by
constraining  a couitry's non-interest  current account deficit. Even  this constraint could be
ineffective,  however,  because a country can reduce its assets to restore its desired  low level c F  net
worth in the long  rm.  Finally, a government  can impose  its own  high discount  rate on the res-.  cf
the economy  through policies  that tax private sector capital accumulation.  If the government 3
discount rate is unchanged  before and after debt relief, then these  bad policies will persist wilUh
debt relief.
23 See  Easterly  and  Levine  1997 on ethnic polarization.8
A. The  Model
I assume producer-consumers  accumulate  total assets  A with rate of return r.  Total assets
include  physical capital, human  capital, infrastructure,  technological  knowledge  and so on.  The
country accumulates  foreign  liabilities  L, which  also carry an interest rate equal to r.
Concessionary  debt financing  is divided  into a grant element  and into a loan element;  the grant
element  is accounted  as a lump  sum transfer, while the loan element  is defined  as the present
value of debt service  payments  and carries a market  interest rate.
The country's Gross Domestic  Product will  be simply  GDP=rA.  The country's Gross
National  Product subtracts  out factor  payments:
(1) GNP = rA-  rL
The country's net worth W is simply equal  to A-L, so we could also say GNP=rW. In terms of
the usual macro identities,  the change  in W is equal  to saving,  the change  in A to investment
(although  in a much broader sense  than the usual national accounts  definition),  and the change in
L to the current account deficit. So the identity  that the current account  deficit is equal to
investment  minus saving is simply  a rearrangement  of the definition  of net worth W=A-L in flow
terms:
(2)  L =  -W
I make  the usual assumptions  that all individuals  are identical  and maximizing  over an infinite
horizon the present discounted  value of utility from consumption:
'  e-"tC'-




We get the usual solution  for the optimal  growth of consumption:9
C=r-p
Growth  is lower the higher is the discount  rate p and the lower  is the intertemporal  elasticity  of
substitution  (1/a). The ratio of consumption  to wealth in the steady state is where W and C grow
at the same  rate, which  from (4) and (5) implies:
c6 = r[l  I-] + P (6) 
Note that the higher the discount  rate, and the lower is the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution
(if r>p),  the higher is the propensity to consume  out of wealth. The inverse  of this is the ratio of
wealth to consumption,  or assets - liabilities  to consumption:
A-L  _  1
[I]+P
A high  discount rate is associated  with a low ratio of A-L to C, or in other words a low  asset ratio
(A/C) and a high external debt ratio (L/C).
If r>p, the optimal  net worth  ratio depends  positively  on the intertemporal  elasticity  of
substitution  (1/a).  It has been argued  in the literature  that poor countries  have a low
intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution. 24 Thus, we would  expect  poor countries like the highly
indebted  poor counitries  (HIPCs) to have a lower net worth to consumption  ratio than richer
countries. Again, lDwer  net worth implies some combination  of higher debt and lower assets
Equation (7) gives some insight into debt relief. It defines  an optimnal  level of net woAtL
(assets net of debt). If debt relief is granted, it will be a one-tirne  lump sum transfer  that redue  es L
but does not affect the long-run  desired  level  of net worth to consumption.  Therefore, if the
behavioralparameters  are unchanged  before and after debt relief, the country  will respond t.
debt relief by new borrowing  until the old ratio of net worth to consumption  is restored. In th:
24 See  Ogaki,  Ostry,  and  Reinhart  1995  and  Easterly  1994.10
same vein, if the terms of lending  are made  more favorable  by substituting concessional  for non-
concessional  debt then countries  will reborrow to maintain  the net present  value of debt service.
Alternatively,  the country  could run down assets to restore the old ratio of net worth to
consumption.25
On the other hand, what would  happen if the parameters change?  If the behavioral
parameters  are changed,  perhaps because a reformist government  succeeds  a spendthrift  one, then
debt relief would  successfully  provide  a painless transition  to a higher ratio of net worth to
consumption  (higher assets and lower debt to consumption  ratios).
In flow terms, we can solve for the ratio of saving  to consumption  as follows:
A-L  r-p (8) A  =  J 
C  r(-l)+  p
Saving  is positive  as long  as r-p>O  and a >1. Saving  could conceivably  be negative  if the
discount  rate was so high  as to exceed  the interest rate. In general,  a higher discount rate means
lower net saving.  Note also that countries  with a high G (low intertermporal  elasticity  of
substitution) will have lower saving.  Lower saving  will involve  some combination  of a higher
current account  deficit L/C  and lower domestic  investment A/C  If debt relief is granted,  this will
be a one-time  lump sum transfer  that will not affect (8); the empirical  prediction  is that saving,
investment,  and current account deficits will be unchanged  before and after debt relief if
behavioral parameters  are unchanged.
Note that if saving  is negative  (r-p<0), there will be negative  growth in GNP (rA-rL).
There is no reason in practice to rule out negative  growth,  as consumption  could go
asymptotically  towards zero. Given  the possible  combination  of asset decumulation  and liability
accumulation  with negative saving,  the commonly  used debt to GDP ratio (L/rA) could trend
25 The consumption  path will  also shift up by the annuity  value of the lump-sum  transfer implied  by debt
relief. In a real life example  of part of this consumption  effect, the President of Nicaragua gave
workers a half day off to celebrate  being part of the HIPC program.11
upward in the longy  run. However, the ratio of net worth to consumption will be stable at the ratio
given in (7).
Another insight from (8) is that any constraint  on LC  will not necessarily  be binding.
The country can adjust  AC  one for one to leave the path of net worth (8) and consumption (5)
unchanged. For example, the country that is forced to reduce its current account deficit coulk
reduce the amount  of productive new investments it is making in physical  and human capitaL WVe
will see this in more detail now.
B. Conditionality on debt ratios
The extent to which saving is decomposed into asset  accumulation minus  external
borrowing is indeterminate in this formulation.  Above, I described one possible reaction to debt
relief is for the country to re-borrow enough to restore the old ratio of net worth to GDP.
However, the external creditors (many of them official lenders) may impose a limit on borrowing.
A common formulation is to provide enough loans as to maintain a certain target debt ratio
(usually a ratio to GDP or to exports). I will suppose here that a country's  external creditors
supply an amount cf credit such that its debt to consumption ratio (L/C) is equal to A  .26 In th s
case, we can solve ifor the ratio of assets to consuirption  from (7) as:
(9 )A  1  + A
Note again that a high discount rate and a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution is assoc6  ited
with a low level of assets relative to consumption.  Note also that the assets to consumption ritio
rises with the permitted debt ratio, which is because consumers optimize with respect to net w3rth
alone and not with respect to its components.
26 The idea of maintaining  a stable external debt to GDP ratio as one criterion  for current account
sustainability  is 2ommon in official agencies and in,  the academic literature.  See for example,  Van12
Equation (9) gives some insight  into debt relief accompanied  by conditionality. Suppose
that a country  has unchanged  rate of return and preferences,  as captured  by r, p, and (.  Suppose
that debt relief lowers  A and imposes  the lower level of borrowing  associated  with maintaining
the new A. This kind of debt relief would simply  cause a one-for-one  reduction  in national assets
with the amount of debt reduction  as percent of GDP. In the long  run the national net worth as a
ratio to consumption  is unchanged  before and after debt relief at the value given by (7).  Since
liabilities  have been reduced,  assets will in the long  run decrease  as well. Being  prevented from
running up as much debt as previously  to finance consumption,  the country  will compensate  by
running down assets instead.  If the current debt level was "unsustainable"  in that it represented
too heavy a burden relative  to assets, then the new debt level will be equally  "unsustainable"
because society's assets will decrease  with the debt.77  If the intertemporal  parameters  are
changed  to put more  weight on the future, however,  then debt relief will not result in asset
decumulation.
C. Breaking out government  and the  private sector
So far I have not distinguished  between  public and private agents, leaving  it unclear
whether a high discount rate and low intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  characterizes  the
government  or the private sector. The key difference  that we might expect  is that the government
will be more impatient,  because of uncertainty  of tenure  and lower concern  for future generations
Wijnbergen  et al. 1992,  Dadush  et  al. 1994,  Milesi-Ferretti  and  Razin  1996,  Cohen  1996,  World  Bank
1998,  and  Roubini  and  Wachtel  1998.
27 I have  treated  all assets  as domestic  capital  stock,  and  have  not  introduced  the possibility  of foreign
assets.  It is straightforward  to  extend  the definition  of A to include  foreign  assets  (capital  flight).
Therefore,  the country  could  reduce  its accumulation  of flight  capital  abroad  in response  to a reduction  in
available  new  borrowing.  There  is ample  scope  for  flight  capital  to adjust  at the margin.  Collier  et al 1999
find  39%  of  African  private  wealth  is held  abroad. Similarly,  Ajayi  1997  finds  that  the stock  of
accumulated  capital  flight  over  1980-91  was  on average  40 percent  of the external  debt  outstanding  in  the
HIPCs,  with  such  extremes  as Rwanda  (94.3  percent),  and  Kenya  (74.4  percent).  Of course,  the flight
capital  is in  private  hands  while  the  debt  is public,  so  there  is the "transfer  problem"  of  taxing  the private
sector  to pay  the public  debt.13
of government.  I will thus assume that the government  has a higher discount  rate than the priva.te
sector.
The first, most obvious,  model  of the government  would  simply recast the above as the
government's maximization  problem  with respect to government  consumption  over  an infinhe
horizon. All the above results would  go through, simply  adding a "g" subscript  to all the
parameters.  In particular, high  discount rate governments  will have lower net worth  to
consumption  ratio, part of which is a higher government  debt to consumption  ratio.
The second  model  I will do of the government  focuses  on the tradeoff between  taxing the
private sector to fiaance government  consumption  today versus government  consumption
tomorrow  financed  by the fature tax base (which  is decreasing  in the tax rate today). To focus on
this tradeoff,  I assume the government  follows  an externally  imposed  balanced budget  rule. To
focus attention  on the discount  rate, I assume that the intertemporal  elasticity of subsitution  is
equal to unity for both parties. The private sector accumulates  net worth  with the same  model as
above, except that the government  imposes  a tax rate X on income. The rate of growth of privTat:e
consumption  C,,  and private  wealth W,, in the optimal  steady state is as follows:
(I10)  `F  = C'  = (I(]-T)r-PX
The goverinment  finances  its own consumption  Cg  with its income tax revenues:
(1  1) Cg-trWx
The government  maximizes  the present discounted  value of government  consumption  over ti:  ne,
taking  into account the effect of the tax rate on private accumulation.  Hence it maximizes  wiL  h
respect  to the tax rate t:
(12) f e P't  hI Cgdt
014
The control  variable is the tax rate X and the state variable  is private wealth W,,.  Consumption  is
given as a function  of the tax rate by (11) and accumulation  of private wealth is given by (10).
The optimal  tax rate for the government  yields  the following  growth rate of government
consumption:
C9
(13)  -g = r - px  - Pg
C9
We can see from (11) that government  consumption  will grow at the same rate as private
wealth. Equating  (10) and (13) gives  us the solution  for the optimal  tax rate:
(14) 1=  Pg
r
The optimal  tax rate is increasing  in the government's  discount rate. Intuitively,  the government
is trading off consumption  today (increasing  in x) versus consumption  tomorrow (increasing  in
private wealth tomorrow  and thus decreasing  in c).  A high discount rate government  will choose
to tax the private sector heavily. The government  will succeed  on imposing  its intertemporal
preferences  on the whole  economy  through its policies. The policies may include  predatory
behavior  that implicitly  rather than explicitly  taxes capital accumulation,  such as high corruption,
real overvaluation,  a high black market  premium,  high inflation,  or financial  repression.
The empirical  prediction  is that a high  discount  rate government  will have bad policies
that explicitly  or implicitly  tax the private sector. If the government's  high discount  rate is
unchanged  over time, then we would expect  these bad policies to remain  unchanged  before and
after debt relief.
D. Other theoreticalpredictions
I have not covered  all the ways in which debt relief can lead to bad incentives.  The way
that debt relief has been granted,  offering  progressively  more favorable  terms over time for two
decades,  also has perverse incentive  effects. Most obviously,  it creates moral  hazard incentives  to
borrow in the expectation  that part of this debt will be forgiven.15
More subtly, incremental  debt relief creates  incentives  to delay  policy reforms, waiting
for a progressively  higher "price" at which  to "sell" policy  reforms. If the rate at which  the
amount of relief is increasing  exceeds  the international  market  interest rate, then policy-makers
will wait to "sell" policy  reforms.
Going further,  we can think of a Hotelling-type  model for the depletion  of the "stock" of
needed  policy reforms. If there is a supply of needed  reforms in HIPCs and a demand  for reform
by donors, then the equilibrium  "price" of a marginal  reform will rise at the rate of interest.  If
HIPCs reform  "too fast", this would  drive down  the price below the interest rate trajectory --
which means that IIPCs prefer to wait in such a case, driving  the price back up to the equilibrium
interest rate trajectory.  This suggests  policy-makers  will adopt a gradualist  rather than big-bang
strategy of economic  reform in response  to gradual debt relief, only gradually  depleting  their
stock of "necessary  reforms." This result is undesirable  because it means that countries  will be
stuck longer with poor policies.
There is also a perverse incentive  created  by the response of debt relief to changes ra:heor
than the level of policies. Obviously,  countries  with worse initial  policies have more scope f(:r
improvement.  If debt relief responds  exclusively  to changes, it may result in aid resources  go:  ng
to countries with a worse level of policies on average.  Countries could even engage  in zig-zap
behavior, getting  debt relief as they improve  policies and then backsliding  to the old level of
policies. This is the kind of result that Burnside  and Dollar 1997 depicted  as unproductive  aid:.
Finally, I have been dealing with the demand  for external loans, but not with their suPly,.
Countries  that have negative  growth,  falling  assets, and increasing  debt are poor credit risks. "'he
prospect of debt folrgiveness  also would  tend to chill  private lending.  We could expect  that private
creditors  will stop lending  at some  point. If multilateral  and other official lenders  perceive  their
role as "filling the financing  gap", then their role will increase  over time in countries  with fal.ing
assets and increasirng  debt.16
These other theoretical stories  do not follow  from the models  above, although  they are
not inconsistent  with them.  I will not try to distinguish  these stories  from the "high discount rate
behavior" implied  by the model. One alternate  hypothesis  to mine  would be that highly indebted
poor countries  became highly  indebted  through bad shocks  like adverse  terms of trade growth and
war. This I will test in the results below.  The other testable  predictions  from my model  are that
high debt countries will show other  signs of heavily discounting  the future (such as asset
decumulation),  that new borrowing  will be associated  with debt relief, and that policies will be
worse in high debt countries.  These are sharp predictions  contrasting  with conventional  wisdom
that debt relief finances  or encourages  asset accumulation  and that actual debt falls over time with
improved  terms on the debt.
III. The Empirical  Experience  with  Debt Relief
We can examine  successively  the response  of new debt and assets to debt relief. I
examine  the 41 highly  indebted  poor countries  (HIPCs) as so classified  by the IMF and World
Bank.28 The countries are Angola,  Benin,  Bolivia,  Burkina Faso, Burundi,  Cameroon,  Central
African  Republic,  Chad, Congo (Dem.  Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Cote d'Ivoire,  Equatorial Guinea,
Ethiopia,  Ghana, Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau,  Guyana,  Honduras,  Kenya,  Lao PDR, Liberia,
Madagascar,  Malawi, Mali,  Mauritania,  Mozambique,  Myanmar,  Nicaragua, Niger,  Rwanda, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal,  Sierra Leone, Somalia,  Sudan, Tanzania, Togo,  Uganda, Vietnam,
Yemen, and Zambia.
The reader may worry that we have a sample  selection  bias, because these countries  were
classified  as HIPCs at the end of the period. Hence, it would  not be so surprising  if we find that
things did not go well for these  countries in the period prior to their classification. However,  this
sample selection  is justified because it is this group that the debt relief efforts targeted. We can
think of the following  results as documenting  the extent  of adverse selection  in debt relief efforts.
28 See  the World  Bank  web  site  www.worldbank.org\hipc.  See  also  IMF  (1997).L7
We will retrace the path of this group to see if the prediction  of unchanged  behavior  before and
after debt relief hold  r elative to other developing  countries.
A. Debt accumulation  and asset decumulation
The theoretical  model  predicted  that a high discount  rate country would  be characterized
not only  by high debt accumulation  but also by low asset accumulation,  or even asset
decumulation. This contrasts  with the traditional  view that debt accumulation  finances  asset
accumulation.  The natural place to look for evidence  on asset accumulation  is investment. This is
a poor indicator,  however,  as Devarajan,  Easterly, and Pack 1999  have found  that traditionally
measured investment is not productive  in Africa where  most of the HIPCs are concentrated.
A better albeit indirect  way of getting  at productive  asset accumulation  is to look  at the
behavior  of per capita output. If we take per capita output as proportional  to a broad concept of
productive capital per capita, including  physical and human capital, technological  capital,
knowledge,  etc., then :he evolution  of per capita output would  tell us something  about the
tangible and intangible  forms of asset accumulation.
The natural measure  of HIPCs' external  liabilities  is their debt to GDP ratio. However,
since much of the HIPCs' debt is concessional,  the face value of the debt is a poor measure  of th.
debt burden. I use the present value of debt service  as a ratio to GDP as the debt indicator.
Surprisingly,  despite  the attention  given to the poor countries' debt problem, I was unable to fin:t
time series of the present value of debt service  for HIPCs. (The  World Bank's Global
Development  Finance reports an estimate  of the present  value of debt service for the latest year,
while earlier reports re.ported  three year moving  averages  going  back to 1991.  These moving
averages  do not give internally  consistent  numbers for individual  years, so I do not use them.)
Using data on scheduled  debt service  from the Debt Reporting  System of the World Bank, a timt18
series 1979-97 for each of the HIPCs'  present value of debt obligations was calculated for this
paper.29
Figure  1 shows the evolution of the HIPCs'  per capita output in 1997 prices and their
median debt to GDP ratio in present value terms. 30 If we take the trend fall in output over 1979-97
as representing a fall in potential output, and potential output as proportional to a broad notion of
productive assets, then there was asset decumulation at the same time as there was high debt
accumulation.  The HIPCs'  debt problem arose not just because of new borrowing, but because of
disinvestment in productive potential.  This is consistent with a story in which the HIPCs can be
characterized  as persistently high discount rate countries.
There is some possibility of a break point towards the end of the period in which the debt
ratio went down and output went up.  This corresponds to the period after the new HIPC debt
relief initiative was launched, which could indicate more success for this latest debt relief attempt.
However, the period after the break is too short to evaluate whether it's  a permanent  change.
I next turn to data on oil production,  for which we have data 1987-96. There are  10
HIPCs that are oil producers.  Oil production is a form of asset decumulation, since it takes an
asset in the form of oil in the ground and turns it into cash that can be an alternative form of
financing consumption if conventional debt is constrained.  Did HIPCs have higher oil production
growth over this period of debt relief than did the non-HIPC oil producers? The answer is yes.
The average log growth in oil production is 6.6 percentage points higher in the HIPCs than in the
non-HIPCs, which is a statistically significant difference. The average log growth in oil
production  in HIPCs was 5.3 percent; in non-HIPCs, it was -1.3  percent.
29 The discount  rate used is the average  LIBOR over 1979-1997.
30  Since debt is not in PPP prices, I also use a non-PPP  measure  of output  - the World  Bank's World
Development  Indicators  Atlas method  per capita income in 1997,  and then apply median real per
capita growth in HIPCs to get the series. The HIPCs' median debt to GDP ratio is somewhat  lower
than that in the World  Bank's Global Development  Finance  (50% here compared  to 70% in GDF),
because  the discount  rate I used is higher. Nevertheless,  the correlation of debt to GDP ratios between
GDF and mine  across the HIPCs  is .90.19
Another  forra of asset decumulation  taking  place at this time was sales of state enterprises
to foreign  purchasers. We have data on privatization  foreign  exchange  revenues for 1988-1997.
Over this period, total sales of state enterprises  in the HIPCs amounted  to $US4 billion. This is an
underestimate,  because not all privatization  revenues  are recorded  in the official  statistics. Even
using this flawed data, there is a positive  and significant  correlation  of .35 across the 41 HIPCs
between  the amount of debt forgiveness  and the amount of privatization foreign  exchange
revenues.  Privatization  may have been done for efficiency  reasons or even as a condition  for
debt relief, but it also may suggest a high discount  rate economy  running down its assets.
B. Debt relief and new borrowing
The data on debt relief from the World Bank's World Debt Tables only  go back to 1989.
The relationship  between  debt relief and new borrowing  over  this period is interesting:  total debt
forgiveness  for 41 highly indebted  poor countries over 1989-97  totaled US$33  billion, while their
new borrowing  was IJS$41 billion. This seems to point in the direction of the prediction  above
that debt relief will be met with an equivalent  amount  of new borrowing. 3'
Was new borrowing  the highest  in the countries that got the most debt relief? Running  a
regression  for the 40 [IPCs that have complete  data, there is a statistically  significant  associati:3n
between  average debt relief as a percent of GDP and new net borrowing  as percent of GDP. Thi
offset in this case is less than one for one: 1 percentage  point of GDP higher debt forgiveness
translated into .34 percent of GDP new net borrowing.
31 Unfortunately,  these  figures  are in  nominal  rather  than  NPV  terms.  However,  since  NPV  of debt  to
exports  is fairly  stable  over  this  period,  this  supports  the idea  that  new  borrowing  replaced  forgiven  debt.
Also,  the relationship  be-tween  debt  relief  and  new  borrowing  year  by year  is not  contemporaneous.  NewA
borrowing is concentrated  toward the beginning  of the period, while debt relief is concentrated  toward thb.
end  of the  period.  One  possibility  is that  the high  level  of new  borrowing  caused  a threshold  to  be passed
that resulted  in debt relief; this possibility  suggests a potentially  serious problem  with moral hazard.
Another  related possibility  is that borrowing  nations  expected  progressively  more  favorable  terms of debl:
relief and engaged in pra-emptive  new borrowing  to keep their long-run  ratio of net worth to GDP
unchanged.  In this case, debt relief was an illusion.  Finally,  it is possible  that the debt relief efforts of 19'J6-
97 were more successful  than earlier efforts.20
Another  bit of evidence  that debt relief did not lower debt significantly  is to look  at
external debt to export ratios over  the period 1979-1997.  I again use the present value of debt
service  as a measure  of external  debt, but now as a ratio to exports.  I again use 1979 as a base
year because it was the year the UNCTAD  summit  inaugurated  the current wave of debt relief. I
have data for 28-37 highly indebted  poor countries  over the period 1979-97.  Despite  the ongoing
debt relief, the median  present value debt to export ratio rose strongly  from 1979 to 1997 (Figure
2).  We can see three distinct  periods: (1) 1979-87  when debt  ratios rose strongly;  (2) 1988- 1994
when  debt ratios remained  constant;  and (3) 1995-97  in which debt ratios fell. The behavior  in
periods (1) and (2) is consistent  with failed  debt relief,  while the fall in the last period may
indicate  that the 1996  HIPC debt relief program  has been  more successful  than earlier efforts.
Despite  the fall in the last period, however,  the median  debt to export ratio is statistically
significantly  higher in 1997 than it was in 1979.  Again  this result is not surprising  given that we
have selected  the sample  based on their debt at the end of the period. Still, it suggests that for a
large group of 41 countries, new borrowing  (more than) kept pace with  the amount  of debt relief,
as would  have been predicted  by the model  for countries  with unchanged  discount rates. 32
C. Regression  analysis of HIPCs' macroeconomic  imbalances  and country  policies
In this section,  I develop  summary statistics  of HIPCs' policy  stance. I regress an average
over the debt relief period 1980-97  of each  policy indicator  or macroeconomic  imbalance  on the
log of initial income,  and a dummy  for HIPCs for the whole  sample of LDCs.
Table 1 shows  the results. We see that the average levels  over 1980-97  of current
account deficits,  budget deficits (with or without  grants), M2/GDP, and real overvaluation,  were
worse for HIPCs. The differences  in HIPCs' real interest  rate, black market  premium,  and
32 The calculation  for this  paper  that  the  median  debt  to export  ratio  in 1997  is 221%  is lower  than  the
World  Bank's  Global  Development  Finance  (GDF)  estimate  of 278%.  Obviously,  the present
discounted  value  is sensitive  to the  assumption  on  the  discount  rate. Still,  the correlation  across
HIPCs  between  the debt  to export  ratios  from  GDF  and  those  from  this  paper  in 1997  is .78.2:L
Table 1: Regression  results  for policies  in LDCs 1980-97,  controlling  for income
(Sample of all LDCs)  _  _
Dependent  variable, average 1980-97  Current  account  balance/  Budget deficit excl
GDP  grants/GDP
______________  _____  _  coefficient  t-statistic coefficient  t-statistic
Log income, 1979  0.08  0.11  1.47  2.08
Dummy for HIPCs  -5.58  -4.36  -4.26  -3.67
R2  0.25  0.32
#observations  771  81
Dependent  variable, average 1980-97  Budget deficit incl  M2/GDP
grants/GDP
coefficient  t-statistic coefficient  t-statistic
Log income, 1979  -0.34  -0.46  1.50  0.48
Dummy for HIPCs  -4.97  -3.94  -15.65  -2.96
R2  0.19  0.15
#observations  84  831
Dependent  variable, average 1980-97  Log (l+inflation rate)  Index of overvaluation
(based on Dollar 1992)
coefficient  t-statistic coefficient  t-statistic
Log income, 1979  0.13  2.60  9.07  1.13
Dummy  for HIPCs  0.15  1.79  64.19  4.92
R2  0.08  0.30
#observations  82  _  68
Dependent  variable, average 1980-97  Real interest  rate  Log (I +black market
premium)
coefficient  t-statistic coefficient  t-statist v
Log income, 1979  -0.01  -0.47  0.04  0.61)
Dummy  for HIPCs  -0.05  -1.79  0.09  0.7,
R2  0.05  0.01
#observations  74  77




Log income, 1979  0.07  0.72
Dummy for HIPCs  -0.33  -2.15
R2  0.11
#observations  77
inflation  rates from the:  rest of the LDC sample are not statistically  significant  (although inflationi
and real interest rates are marginally  significant  at the 10% level).22
The HIPCs also were worse on the broad measure  of policy given  by the World Bank's
Country  Policy and Institutional  Assessment  (CPIA).  This measure  of policies not only  includes  a
rating of policy  stance, but also of institutional  quality  - like the prevalence  of corruption. The
HIPCs' average CPIA 1980-97  was worse than the CPIA for other  LDCs.
The result on the current  account deficit is not surprising:  obviously  HIPCs got to be
HIPCs by borrowing  a lot! The results on policies  are not as obvious,  as the debt accumulation
could have come from bad external shocks  (on which  more in a moment)  rather than bad policies
like  real overvaluation,  low financial  depth, and poor Country Policy and Institutional
Assessments.
Even more interesting  is to examine  the composition  of financing  the current account
deficit. Table 2 shows  some intriguing  patterns. First, HIPCs received  less foreign  direct
investment  (FDI) than other LDCs, controlling  for income.  This may be an indirect  indicator of
the bad policies found  on the other indicators:  investors  don't want to invest in an economy  with
high budget deficits, high overvaluation,  and high  corruption. Investors  may also have worried
what debt relief may have meant for other  external liabilities  like  the stock of direct foreign
investment. It also is a confirmation  of the prediction  that private  capital flows will dry up in
high discount  rate economies  with falling  assets and increasing  debt.
Second, despite their poor policies,  HIPCs received  more in World Bank and IMF
financing  than other LDCs.  The result on World  Bank financing  is controlling  for initial income
(negatively  related to World Bank financing). The effect  (0.96 percent of GDP) is small relative
to the size of the current account deficit,  but large relative  to the mean amount of World Bank
financing  (1. 1  percent of GDP). The share of World Bank financing  in gross disbursements  also
was significantly  higher (by 7.2 percentage  points)  in HIPC than in non-HIPCs.  This confirms  the
prediction  that multilateral  lenders  "filling the financing  gap" will have a significant  role in
financing  high discount rate economies.23
Table 2: Financing  composition  of debt accumulation,  1979-97
Dependent  variable, average 1980-97  Foreign Direct
Investment/  GDP 
coefficient  t-statistic
Log income, 1979  0.11  0.66
Dummy  for HIPCs  -0.84  -2.92
R2  0.17
#observations  77
Dependent  variable, average 1980-97  World Bank Financing/  IMF Financing/  GDP
GDP
coefficient  t-statistic coefficient  t-statistic
Log income, 1979  -0.40  -3.76  0.05  0.41
Dummy for HIPCs  0.96  5.35  0.73  3.40
R2  0.53  0.15
#observations  83  831
Dependent  variable, average 1980-97  World Bank share of  IMF Share of
disbursements/  GDP  Disbursements/  GDP
___________________________________________  coefficient  t-statistic coefficient  t-statistic
|Log income, 1979  -8.10  -5.72  0.69  0.79
Dummy  for HIPCs  7.17  3.14  4.37  3.12
R2  0.54  0.13
#observations  761  76
The results are similar  for the IMF. I regressed  IMF financing  on a constant, initial  per
capita income and the IHIPCs  dummy. The HIPC dummy  is indeed  significant.  Like the World
Bank HIPC dummy,  the effect  is small relative  to current account deficits (0.73 percent of GDP),
but large relative to the non-HIPCs  average  IMF financing  (0.5 percent of GDP). The HIPC effec
for the IMF's share of clisbursements  is of the same sign and significant  - the IMF had 4.4
percentage  points more of gross disbursements  to HIPCs than to non-HIPCs,  controlling  for
income. The HIPCs got to be HIPCs in part by borrowing  from the World Bank and IMF. I will
go into more detail on who gave loans to the HIPCs (and when)  in a later section.
One explanation  of the HIPCs' becoming  highly indebted  is that they suffered adverse
terms of trade shocks. Ilowever, Table 3 shows  that the least-squares  log growth in terms of
trade over 1979-97  was not significantly  worse for HIPCs. The LDC sample as a whole shows24
significantly  worsening  terms of trade over 1979-97,  but the HIPCs do not stand out as any
different than their less highly indebted  neighbors.
Another  possible shock  that might  have caused HIPCs to have high  debt ratios is war,
since  it both destroys  productive  assets and causes additional  governrment  spending  that has to be
financed. However, as shown  in Table 3, HIPCs were not more  likely  to be at war than the rest of
the LDC sample. 33
Table 3: Terms of trade shocks  and war, 1979-97  l
Dependent  variable, average 1979-97  Least-squares  log  Percent  of period at war
growth  in terms of trade
coefficient  t-statistic{ coefficient  t-statistic
Log income, 1979  0.00  -0.97  -0.04  -0.75
Dummy for HIPCs  0.00  -0.05  -0.09  -1.10,
R2  0.02  0.()_2
#observations  771  |  76
In sum, we have a pattern of poor policy  indicators that most needed  to be improved  to
avoid a debt crisis. Not surprisingly,  HIPCs' policies  were worse precisely  in those areas - high
current account deficits and budget deficits  -- that led to high debt accumulation.  Less obvious
were bad policies on financial  repression  and exchange  rate overvaluation.  This is consistent  with
these countries having a high discount  rate that was unchanged  before and after debt relief. This
is also consistent  with policy-makers  waiting  for the best deal during the incremental  process of
debt relief. It is also consistent  with the moral  hazard problem  that after the initial  debt relief in
1979,  HIPCs may have rationally  anticipated  that much of their new borrowing  would  be later
forgiven.
D. Current  account deficits  and budget  deficits over  time
In addition  to averages  over the period 1980-97, it is important  also to look for trends.
Did HIPCs' policies get better over  the two decades  of debt relief? On the current account deficit,
33  The war  variable  was the  percent  of time  at war  on  national  terrritory  from  1979  to 1994.25
perhaps the most important  measure  of policy  stance for highly indebted  countries,  the news is
not good. (This measure  of the current account deficit  treats grants as revenue  rather than
financing.)  The median  current account deficit  has stayed high and constant at around 7.5 percent
of GDP over the period of incremental  debt relief 1979-97.
The budget deficit to GDP ratio also fails to improve  over the debt relief period 1979  -97
(figure 3), for a saraple of 23-35 countries,  if anything  deteriorating  to the very high level of
around 1O  percent of GDP. These figures  treat grants as a source  of financing.  This would  be
justified if we think  of grants as temporary,  with the donors  planning  that the country  exit frorm
needing  foreign aid after a certain interval.  However,  grants in practice may be permanent anc.
they do not imply fiture debt servicing  requirements,  so it's of interest to see the budget deficit
including  grants. The grant-inclusive  budget deficit  still fails to improve  for HIPCs (figure 3).
The results on the current account  dteficit  and budget deficit do not show a clear
improvement  in behavior  during the process of incremental  debt relief. This is consistent  with the
HIPCs being persistently  high discount rate economies.
E. Debt relief and oiher country  policies over time
How have other  HIPC policies behaved  during the period of incremental  debt relief 1  979-
97? As noted in the theoretical  section,  poor policies is one mechanism  by which the governrnmnri
imposes  its own highL  discount  rate on the rest of the economy.  There is also the worry that
countries would  respond  to incremental  debt relief by postponing  policy reforms, waiting  for a
higher "price" at which  to "sell" policy reforms. Alternatively,  countries  could slowly reform,
selling  off pieces of reform as the price rises. The intent of the debt relief efforts,  in contrast, wis
that policies would imnprove  inmmediately  as a condition  for getting  new debt relief. Which
happened?
The evidence  is very mixed, as shown  in figure  4. The real interest  rate for HIPCs is a.
indicator  of either  the private return to capital if interest  rates are uncontrolled  or financial
repression if there is a nominal  interest rate ceiling.  IIIPCs had flat real interest rates over  time.26
Contrary to the stereotype  of HIPCs as financially  repressed,  the median real interest rate was
positive for most of the period (although  not significantly  different  than zero).
However,  a different  variable related  to financial  repression,  the ratio of M2 to GDP
(financial depth) in HIPCs, shows  a different  picture. We have already seen  that HIPCs had worse
financial  depth than other  LDCs. Financial  depth,  which  King and Levine  (1993a,b)  identified  as
a critical determinant  of growth,  does not improve  in the HIPCs over  time.
The inflation  rate oscillated  in the HIPCs without any clear trend over 1979-97. The
inflation  rate was not in the range that Bruno  and Easterly 1998 identified  as associated  with
negative growth  performance  (40 percent and above),  although  it spent a few  years in the 20-40
danger  zone where there is a high risk of slipping  into the above 40 percent zone (Bruno 1995).
HIPCs spent a good  part of the debt relief period  with the black market  premium  above
the 20 percent threshold  defined  by Sachs and Warner 1995 as one of the criteria for being a
"closed" economy. After a wild period in the mid-1980s,  however,  there is a tendency  for both
the median and variance of the black market  premium  to fall over time  in the HIPCs.34
There is good  news and bad news on another  exchange  rate measure, the measure of
deviation  of local prices from purchasing  power  parity at the official  exchange  rate. I construct
an purchasing  power  parity index of Dollar 1992  to benchmnark  the real exchange  rate as an
average of 1976-85  for each country,  then convert  it to a time series  using the usual definition  of
the real exchange  rate (PD.omestiJ(E*PUS)).  The good news  is that the real exchange  rate depreciates
over 1979-1997  in the HIPCs. This is one of the major achievements  of this 20-year process of
adjustment  and debt relief.
The bad news is that the initial  position  was extreme  overvaluation  and the improvement
was only gradual, so that the average exchange  rate in the HIPCs for the period  is severely
34 Drazen  and Easterly 1999  find that  inflation  and  the black  market  premium  display  a "crisis  provokes
reform" property, whereas  the growth rate, the budget deficit, and the current account deficit  do not.
They also find that aid is reduced  at high levels of inflation  and the black market  premiurm,  while it
increases  with current account deficits and budget deficits.27
overvalued  (as we saw in the regression  analysis). Another  piece of bad news is that other LDCs
also had a tendency  toward real depreciation,  so that at the end  of the period the HIPCs were still
24 percent overvalued  relative to other LDCs.
The HIPCs fared worse on our broadest measure  of policy, the World Bank's subjective
rating called the Country Policy and Institutional  Assessment  (CPIA).35  The HIPCs display  no
clear trend over tim,  . This is consistent  with  the story that intertemporal  preferences  were
unchanged  before and after debt relief, and the government  used poor policies to impose  its high
discount rate on the whole economy.
F. Composition  offinancing
Figure 5 shows  the composition  of gross disbursements  to HIPCs over 1979-97. The
prediction  that private credit would  disappear and multilateral  financing  assume an increased
share are more  than confirmed. World Bank International  Development  Association  (IDA)
financing  alone  more than tripled  its share in disbursements.  The share of private credit began the,
period 3.6 times higher than the IDA share; by the end of the period,  the share of IDA was 8.6
times higher than that of private financing. The share of IMF financing,  which  began at the saine
level as IDA financing,  remained  roughly unchanged.  The other important  change is away fromri
bilateral financing  in favor of IDA and other multilateral  concessional  finance.
Another important  thing to examine  is net transfers (net flows rminus  interest payments.
On debt that carries a market interest  rate, positive  net transfers imply  that the debt is growing
faster than the interest rate. This implies  the debt is unsustainable  (if the recipient  continued  to
borrow to pay the interest and then some, this would imply  the present  value of debt is
unbounded). Net trarsfers from concessional  sources,  on the other  hand, carry a large grant
35 The  CPIA  has  four components,  which  are Macroeconomic  Management  and Sustainability  of Reforn  i  ;,
Policies  for Sustainable  and  Equitable  Growth,  Policies  for  Reducing  Inequalities,  and  Public  Sectcl
Management.  It is available  for 1977  to 1998.  These  results  should  be taken  with  a grain  of salt,  nol
only  because  of the subjective  element  but also  because  the methodology  for  the rating  has  changed
over  time.28
element  and so don't have the same implications  for debt sustainability;  if anything  higher
concessional  net transfers should increase  the likelihood  of sustainability.
Figure  6a shows  that all the non-concessional  net transfers were positive,  and so
contributed  to the rapid growth  of debt during 1979-87  (recall figure 2).  However,  there were
also large net transfers from concessional  sources  (IDA, other  multilaterals,  and the bilaterals)  -
total net transfers to the HIPCs of US$33 billion  -- which  makes it all the more striking  that these
countries  became increasingly  highly indebted  in net present value terms over this period.
Figure 6b shows  that there  was a huge shift  in net transfers  from 1979-87  to 1988-97,  a
period in which debt ratios stabilized. Large positive  net transfers  from IDA and bilateral
concessional  sources offset  negative  net transfers for IBRD, IMF, bilateral non-concessional,  and
private  sources.36 This  was another  form of "debt relief', since it exchanged  concessional  debt
with a large grant element  for non-concessional  debt. However,  the net present value of debt
remained  roughly  unchanged  over this period, at least until the last few years, suggesting  that
these economies  persisted  in "high discount rate behavior."
A cynical  interpretation  would  be that as countries could not or would  not pay their non-
concessional  debt, official lenders  replaced  their non-concessional  debt with concessional  debt
that had a large grant element.  This should  have significantly  eased the debt servicing  burden of
the HIPCs. Even so, the HIPCs still had enough of a debt problem  at the end of the period that
lenders initiated more debt relief.
Concessionary  finance used unproductively  leads to indebtedness  which is then used as an
argument  for further concessionary  finance.
--Bauer (1972,  p. 127)
III. Conclusions
The theoretical  models  in this paper predict that countries with  unchanged  preferences  in
the long  run will respond  to debt relief by running up new debts or by running down assets. There
36 IDA  is the concessional  lending  arm  of the World  Bank,  while  IBRD  is the  non-concessional  lending
part of  the World  Bank.29
are some signs  that the incremental  process of debt relief over  the past two decades  fulfilled :hese
predictions.  New borrowing  was correlated  with debt relief so that debt ratios actually got w3)rs,e.
Per capita output had a trend  decline,  suggesting  decumulation  of productive  assets, broadly
defined. Oil reserves were depleted  more rapidly and sales of state enterprises  to foreign owne-s
were higher in coultries that got debt relief.
Policies by which government  irnplicitly  or explicitly  taxes asset accumulation  displayed
a mixed  pattern of some gradual policy  improvements  and some  failures to improve.  The most
important  policy indicators for highly  indebted  countries--the  current account deficit and the
budget deficit - failed to improve,  and they remained  above other LDCs' levels controlling  fc  r
their initial values in 1979.
There is also some good  news. HIPCs' exchange  rate overvaluation  and black rnarkel:
premium  improved  over  time. Debt ratios fell in the past 3 years, and per capita income  rose. r lis
could indicate  that the most recent HIPC debt relief initiative  has been more successful than
earlier debt relief efforts, although  we have only  a few  years of data on which  to draw
conclusions.
Still, the problem of the adverse  selection  of HIPCs remains  a serious one.  By 1997,  E .ith
the coming  of the new multilateral  debt relief initiative,  HIPCs received 63% of the flow of
resources  devoted  to poor countries  despite only accounting  for 32% of the population of thost
countries. 37 Including  debt reduction  as aid, Cote d'Ivoire received 1276 times more per capit,
aid net flow than India in 1997.  38
The results on composition  of financing  are also rather alarming. The HIPCs' debt cri  sic
developed  because of the expansion  of official lending. The official lenders  did not seem  to
37 This  calculation  sums  net flows  of long-term  debt  and  debt  stock  reductions  going  to HIPCs  and  to o ie
low  income  economies,  where  low  income  is defined  as in  the World  Bank's  World  Development
Indicators.
38 India's low per capiLa  aid receipts represent  not only its suffering  from the adverse  selection  of aid
donors,  but also from the tendency  of large countries  to receive  small  amounts of aid per capita.30
follow  the same prudential  rules as private capital, which  pulled  out of the HIPCs. The IMF and
World Bank provided  more financing  to HIPCs over 1979-97  than other  countries  of their income
level, despite their worse policies.  In the second  half of the period, positive  net transfers from
IDA and bilateral concessional  sources offset  negative  net transfers  from IBRD, IMF, bilateral
non-concessional  and private sources.
What are the policy implications? Debt relief is futile for countries with  unchanged  long-
run preferences. At best, only  countries  that display  a fundamental  shift in their intertemporal
preferences  should  be eligible  for debt relief. To assess whether  countries  have made such a
fundamental  shift in preferences,  some  track record of low discount  rate behavior  should  be
required  prior to granting  debt relief. There  were important  steps in this direction  in the 1996
HIPC initiative,  which  unfortunately  may be weakened  by the 1999  Cologne  G-7 proposal that
suggests speeding  up the process of debt relief. Official lenders  should not keep "filling the
financing  gap" in violation  of prudential  standards  of creditworthiness.
Perhaps what has been most damaging  to incentives  for new borrowing and delayed
reforms is the creeping  process of debt relief over  the past 20 years. Although  debt relief is done
in the name of the poor, the poor are worse off if debt relief creates  incentives  to delay  reforms
necessary  for growth.
A once  for all program is greatly  superior  to a gradual  program of increasing  relief. The
once  for all program has to attempt to establish  a credible  policy lnat debt relief will never again
be offered in the future, and that it is only giving  debt relief to countries  with a shift in
intertemporal  preferences.  If this is problematic,  then the whole  idea of debt relief is problematic.
It results in more resources  going  to countries  with bad policies than poor countries with good
policies. Why should  the HIPCs receive  four times  the aid per capita of less indebted  poor
countries, as happened in 1997? If there is any expectation  that donors  will continue  to favor the
highly indebted  in the future, then debt relief will not be successful.31
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Figure 1: Extemal Debt/GDP  (present value terms) and per capita
income in Highly Indebted Poor Countries
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Figure  2: 95%  confidence  interval  for median  present  value of debt of
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Figure  3: Current  Account  and  Fiscal  Balances  Over  Time  in HIPCs
95%  Confidence  Interval  for median  Budget deficits excluding  grants,
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Figure 4: HIPC Country Policy Indicators Over Time, 95% confidence interval for medians
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Figure  5: Composition  of  gross  disbursements  to HIPCs







60%  / 






30% - lateral  non-
concessional
20%  -
10%  - IDA
0%I  I  I  I  I
1979  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989  1991  1993  1995  199739






Bilateral  Other  multilateral  Private  Other multilateral
Concessional  concessional  nonconcessional





-10  - -5-
IDA  Other  multilateral  IMF  Bilateral  Non-
concessional  ConcessionalPolicy Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2201  Financial  Development  and Industrial Biagio  Bossone  October  1999  E. Mekhova
Capital  Accumulation  85984
WPS2202  Specialization  without  Regret:  Michael  R. Carter  October  1999  M. Fernandez
Transfer  Rights,  Agricultural  Yang  Yao  33766
Productivity,  and investment  in an
Industrializing  Economy
WPS2203 Market  versus  Administrative  Michael  R. CarteF  October  1999  M. Fernandez
Reallocation  of  Agricultural  Land  Yang  Yao  33766
in a Period  of Rapid  industrialization
WPS2204  Corruption  under  Moral  Hazard  Gunnar  S. Eskeland  October  1999  H. Sladovich
Henrik  Thiele  37698
WPS2205  Foreign-Owned  Capital  and  Marcelo  Olarreaga  October  1999  L.  Tabada
Endogenous  Tariffs  36896
WPS2206  Household  Childcare  Choices  and  Michael  M. Lokshin  October  1999  P. Sader
Women's  Work  Behavior  in Russia  33902
WPS2207  Jamaica's  Food  Stamp  Program:  Kene  Ezemenari  October  1999  G. Peralta
Impacts  on Poverty  and  Welfare  Kalanidhi  Subbarao  37405
WPS2208  Ethnic  Partition  as a Solution  to  Nicholas  Sambanis  October  1999  H. Sladovich
Ethnic  War:  An Empirical  Critique  37698
of the Theoretical  Literature
WPS2209  Does  Corruption  Relieve  Foreign  Shang-Jin  Wei  October  1999  H. Sladovich
Investors  of the Burden  of Taxes  37698
and  Capital  Controls?
WPS221  0 The  Sliperry  Slope:  Explaining  the  Francisco  H. G. Ferreira  October  1999  G. llogon
Increase  in Extreme  Poverty  in Urban Ricardo  Paes  de Barros  33732
Brazil,  1976-96
WPS2211  Competition  Policy,  Developing  Bernard  Hoekman  October  1999  L.  Tabada
Countries,  and  the  World  Trade  Peter  Holmes  36896
Organization
WPS2212  Is African  Manufacturing  Skill-  Howard  Pack  October  1999  H. Sladovich
Constrained?  Christina  Paxson  37698
WPS2213  Fiscal  Solvency  and Sustainability  Hinh  T. Dinh  October  1999  M. Rani
in Economic  Management  32057Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2214  Trade Policy  and Market  Access  Constantine  Michalopoulos  October  1999  L. Tabada
Issues  for Developing  Countries:  36896
Implications  for the Millennium
Round
WPS2215  Implementation  of Uruguay  Round  J. Michael  Finger  October  1999  L.  Tabada
Commitments:  The  Development  Philip  Schuler  36896
Challenge
WPS2216 Corruption  and  Trade  Tariffs,  or  Roberta  Gatti  October  1999  R. Gatti
a Case  for Uniform  Tariffs  38735
WPS2217  Border,  Border,  Wide  and Far,  David  C. Parsley  November  1999  H. Sladovich
How  We  Wonder  What  You  Are  Shang-Jin  Wei  37698
WPS2218  Who  Avoids  and  Who  Escapes  Wlodzimierz  Okrasa  November  1999  S. Fallon
Poverty  during  the Transition:  38009
Evidence  from Polish  Panel  Data,
1993-96
WPS2219  The Effect  of  the United  States'  Emiko  Fukase  November  1999  L.  Tabada
Granting  Most  Favored  Nation  Will  Martin  36896
Status  to Vietnam
WPS2220  A Quantitative  Evaluation  of  Emiko  Fukase  November  1999  L.  Tabada
Vietnam's  Accession  to the ASEAN  Will Martin  36896
Free  Trade  Area
WPS2221  The Dynamics  of Poverty  and  the  Wlodzimierz  Okrasa  November  1999  S. Fallon
Effectiveness  of Poland's  Safety  38009
Net  (1993-96)
WPS2222  Labor  Market  Integration  in the  Maurice  Schiff  November  1999  L.  Tabada
Presence  of Social  Capital  36896
WPS2223 Integrated  Financial  Supervision:  Michael  Taylor  November  1999  S. Torres
Lessons  from Northern  European  Alex  Fleming  39012
Experience
WPS2224 Growth  Forecasts  Using  Time  Series  Aart Kraay  November  1999  R. Bonfield
and  Growth  Models  George  Monokroussos  31248
UJ'?R)